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Whose Art is It Anyway? Title Disputes
and Resolutions in Art Theft Cases
INTRODUCTION
In 1988, a Monet painting sold at auction for a record price
of $24.3 million.' Just eight years before, Monets could be obtained
for about $300,000.2 Twenty or thirty years ago, the best Impres-
slomsts' works sold for $25,000, with lesser works selling for as
little as $5,000.3 Although many legitimate investors have profited
from this situation, so have many thieves. Boston's Isabella Stewart
Gardner Museum suffered a recent art heist, 4 and auction houses
report that claims of an auction house selling stolen art arise as
frequently as two or three times a week. 5
Given the umqueness of individual works of art, their high
value, their rapid appreciation, and numerous occasions of theft,
courts often are called upon to resolve disputes between two parties
claiming ownership of a particular piece of art. 6 Generally, a prior
owner seeks the recovery of an allegedly stolen work. The typical
defendants in such actions are good faith purchasers. Part I of this
Note introduces the policies underlying these judicial decisions. 7
Next, this Note discusses several of the title dispute cases previously
decided.8 It also examines the rules and policies upon which the
courts have relied.9 Part III analyzes the tension among these
decisions, revealing underlying inconsistencies.' 0 Finally, this Note
offers a viable solution to some of these problems."
I Lyne, Art Law Blooms, Nat'l L.J., June 18, 1990, 1, 37, col. 1.
2 Id. at 36, col. 4.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 37, col. 1.
5Id.
6 See infra notes 32-103 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 32-103 and accompanying text.
9 See mfra notes 24-103 and accompanying text.
,o See mfra notes 107-36 and accompanying text.
" See mfra notes 137-52 and accompanying text.
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I. THE BASES OF TITLE DIsPuTEs
The prevailing rule in the United States is that a purchaser
cannot take good title from a thief.12 However, a purchaser can
assert the statute of limitations as a defense against a prior owner.'
3
Most art replevin actions are brought long after the statute of
limitations expires,14 with courts basing their decisions on an ex-
tended tolling period for the statute of limitations.' 5 The effective-
ness and consistency of these decisions turns on the reconciliation
of the statute of limitations doctrine with the rule that prevents a
thief from passing valid title.
The rule preventing a thief from passing valid title discourages
thefts by decreasing the ready market for stolen items.' 6 A coun-
tervailing policy requires all civil actions and most criminal ones
to be brought within a statutorily prescribed limitations period 7 to
prevent stale claims, penalize slothful plaintiffs, and allow good
faith purchasers some eventual assurance of finality 18
A similar doctrine, known as "laches," or "estoppel by laches,"
is also cited as a motivating factor in resolving competing claims. 19
Like the statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches acts to "aid
the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights."' 2 Unlike
the statute of limitations, which relies upon a theoretical assump-
tion that plaintiffs' claims grow stale after a certain time, the
doctrine of laches requires defendants to prove reliance upon or a
detrimental change in position as a result of plaintiffs' inaction.
2
'
12 See UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-403(1), 1-201(32), (33) (1990) [hereinafter
U.C.C.]; J. EDDY & P WiNsmp, COMimRCIAL TRANSACTIONS 519-20 (1985).
11 See FED. R. Civ. P 8(c). A statute of limitations is "[a] statute prescribing
limitations to the right of action on certain described causes of action or criminal prose-
cution; that is, declaring that no suit shall be maintained on such causes of action, nor any
criminal charge be made, unless brought within a specified period of time after the right
accrued." See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990).
14 See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980) (thirty years elapsed between
the theft and the replevin action).
11 See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 153 A.D.2d 143, 550
N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), appeal granted, 554 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).
16 Weinberg, Markets Overt, Voidable Titles, and Feckless Agents: Judges and Effi-
ciency in the Antebellum Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 56 TuL. L. REv 1, 5, 10 (1981).
17 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ PRAC. L. & R. 214 (McKinney 1990) (action to recover a
chattel must be commenced within three years of accrual).
11 See, e.g., Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
19 Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (6th ed. 1990).
21 Id., see, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Guggenheim, 550
N.Y.S.2d at 621-622.
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Some courts turned to laches over the statute of limitations in art
cases to inject more equitable factors without having to justify the
tolling of the statute of limitations. 22
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT LAw
A. The Adverse Possession Doctrine
The Uniform Commercial Code provides a clear distinction
between void title and voidable title.23 A holder of void title, such
as a thief,24 can transfer only void title.25 A holder of voidable
title, as illustrated by the doctrine of entrustment,26 may transfer
valid title to a good faith purchaser. 27 The effect of void and
voidable title is not always clear, considering the role of the statute
of limitations. If a plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations
or laches from stung for the recovery of a stolen item, then a
purchaser of that item has received valid title for all practical
purposes, even though he originally acquired only void title.28
Typically, this happens when several years or even decades pass
before a plaintiff brings an action for the theft.29 Although under
the Uniform Commercial Code a subsequent purchaser cannot
claim that the thief passed good title to him,30 he undoubtedly will
assert the laches and limitations doctrines to defend his ownership
of purchased property that he has believed to be his for years. 31
Prior to the landmark decision of O'Keeffe v Snyder,32 under
the prevailing rule, the defendant could defeat the plaintiff's claim
2 See Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
21 Void title is simply another way of stating that there is no title. Voidable title is
descriptive of situations in which title could be voided, or could become full title, depending
upon what actions are taken. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (1990).
2' J. EDDY & P WINsmip, supra note 12, at 519-20.
25 Id.
26 U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (entrusting possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods
of that kind gives the merchant the power to transfer all the rights of the entrustor to a
buyer in the ordinary course of business).
2 U.C.C. § 2-403(I). See also U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990) (defining "good faith") and
U.C.C. § 1-201(33) (defining "purchaser").
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 874 (N.J. 1980) ("Our adoption of the discovery
rule does not change the conclusion that at the end of the statutory period title will vest in
the possessor.").
See, e.g., id.
30 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
3 O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873.
3- 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
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by meeting the adverse possession test.33 While the adverse posses-
sion doctrine primarily governs real property,3 4 courts applied the
doctrine to personal property disputes35 because the underlying
policies are similar to the policies underlying the statute of limita-
tions. 36 Both doctrines seek to prevent stale claims, penalize slothful
plaintiffs, and allow defendants some degree of finality 37 In order
to invoke the adverse possession defense, a defendant must prove
that his possession is "hostile, actual, visible, exclusive, and con-
tinuous. "38 If the defendant meets this test for the legislatively
prescribed term of years, plaintiff's claim is barred.3 9
In O'Keeffe, the plaintiff, an artist, alleged that three of her
paintings were stolen from An American Place gallery, which was
run by her late husband Alfred Steiglitz. 40 She claimed that the
theft occurred in 1946.41 In 1976, she discovered that the paintings
had been sold by Ulrich A. Frank to the defendant. 42 According
to Frank, he received the paintings from his father, 43 and he
claimed to have seen the paintings in his father's apartment as
early as 1941. 44 The lower court, using the adverse possession
doctrine, held that Frank's display of the paintings at his residence
and at a one-day local art show failed to meet the test of "visi-
bility, ' 45 often characterized as "open and notorious." 46
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed, rejecting the ad-
verse possession doctrine as non-responsive to the needs of the art
31 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Bagwell, 198 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1948) (purchase of rare violin
from established dealer did not toll the statute of limitations under adverse possession
doctrine); O'Keeffe v. Synder, 405 A.2d 840 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 416
A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980) (trial court held that display of art in home and one day at local
show satisfied adverse possession,,doctnne); see also infra notes 40-45, 54-56 and accom-
panying text.
3, 7 R. PowELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1012 (1980).
31 Id. at 127-28.
36 O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 874.
31 R. PoWELL, supra note 34, at 1012.
O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870 (citing Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Soc'y, 28
A.2d 189 (N.J. 1942).
31 Id. at 874 (the O'Keeffe court, while rejecting the adverse possession doctrine,
provides an excellent summary of the law prior to the O'Keeffe decision).
40 Id. at 865.
" Id.
11 Id. at 866.
43 Id.
- Id.
4' Id. at 846.
46 E.g., O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 871; Joseph v. Leshevich, 153 A.2d 349 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1949).
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world.47 The court agreed that the defendant had not met his
adverse possession burden, but concluded that public display of
purchased artwork is too demanding. 4" The court instead adopted
a due diligence rule in which the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
prove the use of diligence m ascertaining the information necessary
to bring suit.49 This rule tolls the statute of limitations indefinitely
if diligence was exercised. 50 What constitutes diligence is a question
of fact.51 O'Keeffe and Snyder settled before the case could be
retried.52
Other jurisdictions seem more comfortable with the adverse
possession doctrine. 53 In Reynolds v Bagwell,54 the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court held that the purchase of a rare violin from an
established dealer did not toll the statute of limitations because no
concealment of the sale occurred. 55 Thus, the court held that the
defendants did not have to exhibit the item to invoke adverse
possession, even though the plaintiffs had never received actual
notice of the possession and probably never would. 56
B. The Due Diligence Rule
Despite these contradictory positions, the due diligence rule has
been well received, especially by the New York courts. 57 New York
is a leading jurisdiction in this area because of the number and
size of its museums. The evolution of New York's use of the due
diligence doctrine gives insight into the doctrine's flaws.
A federal court applied New York law in Kunstsammlungen
Zu Weimar v Elicofon,5 one of the first New York cases to
discuss the concept of diligence. The case involved a German
museum's attempts to recover a painting stolen from Germany
47 O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
'4 Id. at 871.
41 Id. at 872.
10 Id. at 873.
51 Id.
2 J. DUKEMIIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 127 (1980) [hereinafter J. DuiEMimnER].
5 United States v. One Stradivanus Kieserwetter Violin, 197 F 157 (2d Cir. 1912)
(no concealment occurred where the violin was kept on library table at residence, shown to
many well-known violimsts, and no obligation existed to publicly exhibit violin).
198 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1948).
11 Reynolds v. Bagwell, 198 P.2d 215, 217 (Okla. 1948).
' Id.
See infra notes 58-103 and accompanying text.
5- 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
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during World War 11.19 Apparently, a U.S. serviceman stole the
painting, selling it to U.S. citizens after returning to the United
States. 60 The statute of limitations, although tolled until the United
States recognized East Germany as a country, had expired. 61 New
York, however, recognized an additional standard in art theft cases.
Under New York law, an innocent purchaser becomes a wrongdoer
only when a demand for the property is made and refused. 62 In
order to prevent slothfulness on the plaintiff's part, the court
required that due diligence be exercised in seeking information
sufficient to allow such a demand. 63 The court conducted a due
diligence analysis of the museum's efforts. Although the museum
had been somewhat lackadaisical in its search, 64 the court upheld
the district court's decision that the museum was diligent, citing
the cold war tensions between the United States and the Soviet-
bloc countries as the prime factor for the museum's diminished
search.65
DeWeerth v Baldinger66 again confronted the Second Circuit
with a stolen art claim, also involving the Allied invasion of Ger-
many at the close of World War II. A German citizen, DeWeerth,
owner of a Monet painting stolen during the War, discovered its
whereabouts in 1981 after her nephew learned that the art gallery
Wildenstein & Co. had purchased the painting in 1957 67 The
current "owner," Baldinger, a good faith purchaser, displayed the
art only twice-once when he originally purchased from Wilden-
stein & Co. in 1957, and again in 1970, for only a few days.
Otherwise, the painting remained at his home. 61
DeWeerth had notified the military government in 1946, had
contacted a lawyer in 1948 and other art experts in 1955, and the
West German Bundeskriminalamt in 1957 69 She did not search
59 Kunstsanmlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1152 (2d Cir. 1982).
6 Id. at 1155.
61 Id. at 1164.
61 Id. at 1161.
63 Id. at 1165.
Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F Supp. 829, 851 (E.D. N.Y. 1981)
(plaintiff failed to use Central Collecting Points), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
63 Id. at 852.
836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
67 DeWeerth v. Badinger, 836 F.2d 103, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 105.
Id. (the Bundesknmunalamt is the West German equivilent of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation).
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from 1957 to 1981, when she finally discovered the location of the
painting.70 The district court, m examlung DeWeerth's diligence
for the demand and return reqmrement, found in her favor 71 The
court held that DeWeerth's age of sixty-three and limited resources
justified the cessation of her search in 1957 72 Given this diligence,
the court placed the burden on the defendant to prove his chain
of title or to somehow refute DeWeerth's claim that the painting
was originally stolen.73 The court also noted that the lack of "open
and notorious" display barred an adverse possession defense.74
The court of appeals reversed,75 concentrating on the plaintiff's
diligence. The court applied an O'Keeffe-type rationale, 76 noting
that demand and refusal were unnecessary in all states except New
York.77 The court found DeWeerth's efforts to be lacking because
her reports to the authorities consisted only of the mimmal paper-
work required to report a theft. The court also found DeWeerth's
conversations with her lawyer to be more of an insurance matter
than an attempt to recover the painting. According to the court
DeWeerth failed to give adequate information for investigation to
the art experts. 71
The court relied on DeWeerth's inactions at least as much as
on the deficiencies in her search. First, DeWeerth did not use the
U.S. military's Central Collecting Points (CCP) Program, which
had been set up to hold stolen artwork until claimed by the rightful
owner. The court pointed out that DeWeerth's family had used
the CCP system to recover other stolen artwork. DeWeerth also
failed to use a similar program run by the U.S. State Department. 79
The court indicated that diligence required more than the ef-
forts DeWeerth had undertaken, which ceased in 1957 80 Uncon-
vinced that her age prevented additional efforts, the court noted
that the wealth and sophistication of the art collector, coupled with
7o Id.
" DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F Supp. 688, 696 (S.D. N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 836 F.2d
103 (2d Cir. 1987).
72 Id. at 694-95.
71 Id. at 696.
74 Id. at 697.
,s DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112.
76 Id. at 109.
7 Id.
78 Id. at 111.
79 Id.
10 Id. at 112.
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the value of the painting, indicated that DeWeerth should have
hired someone to continue searching. 8'
Finally, the court concluded that the listing of the Monet's
current holder in a catalogue raisonne,8 2 the publication De-
Weerth's nephew had used in tracking down the painting, indicated
a lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff, who could have
checked the catalog earlier. 83 Such a catalog is not always defim-
tive,8 but often reveals the current holder of a painting, or at least
someone in the chain of title that might lead to the current holder.8 5
The eyes of the art world are on New York again, waiting for
its state court system to decide Solomon R. Guggenheim Founda-
tion v Lubell. 6 This case involves a Chagall Govache,8 7 now valued
at approximately $200,000,88 acquired by the Guggenheim Museum
in the 1930's.89 In the mid-1960's, the museum discovered that the
unexhibited painting was missingP0 The museum did not notify
police because its poor inventory records prevented proving the
theft or determining exactly when the painting disappeared. 9'
In May of 1967, Rachel and Jules Lubell purchased the painting
for $17,000 from the Robert Elkon Gallery in New York, 92 giving
them the status of good-faith purchasers. 9 The painting, displayed
publicly twice, hangs in the Lubells' Manhattan apartment.9 In
August of 1985, the museum discovered the painting's location
from a former employee. 95 Demand and refusal occurred in Janu-
ary of 1986.96 The New York Supreme Court granted the Lubells'
,1 Id.
12 A "catalogue raisonne" is a portfolio of the artist's works that includes such
information as the locations of the works. "[w]hile the catalog is not always definite, the
exclusion of a work could diminish the value of that painting." Lyne, supra note 1, at 37,
col. 1.
' DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112.
" Lyne, supra note 1, at 37, col. 1.
" DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112.
" Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubel, 153 A.D.2d 143, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990), appeal granted 554 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
87 A govache is "a method of painting with opaque colors that have been ground in
water and mingled with a preparation of gum" or "a picture painted by Govache."
WEBSTER's TmiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 982 (1986).
Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
9 Lyne, supra note 1, at 36, col. 3.
Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
91 Lyne, supra note 1, at 36, col. 3.
Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
93 Id., see U.C.C. § 2-403 (1990).
14 Lyne, supra note 1, at 36, col. 4.
91 Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
% Id. at 619.
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motion for summary judgment, holding that the museum had not
been diligent as a matter of law since it had not even bothered to
notify the authorities and apparently searched only its own prem-
ises.97
The Appellate Division unanimously reinstated the museum's
claim. 98 The court interpreted DeWeerth to be based upon estoppel
as much as pure statute of limitations concerns. 99 The court found
the proper standard to be the doctrine of laches, which necessitates
a finding of prejudice to the defendant, as opposed to mere de-
lay 100 The court called for the defendants to share some of the
burden of proof and removed their good-faith purchaser status by
requiring them to prove that they acted reasonably and that there
were no "red flags" to give them notice of a problem with the
painting's title. 1 1 The court also found that the plaintiff's claim
of diligence was not, as a matter of law, unfounded. Passive
activity, said the court, could be reasonable if the finder of fact
believed the museum's contention that publicized searches drive
paintings further underground.0 2 On March 29, 1990, the New
York Court of Appeals granted Lubell's motion for appeal.10 3
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CuRRENT LAW
Although the current case law concerning title disputes over
stolen art may seem consistent, several anomalies underlie its ap-
plication. The current guidelines of the due diligence doctrine pro-
vide uncertainty, not flexibility ,01 Neither the demand and refusal
rule nor the adverse possession doctrine adequately satisfies the
policy issues involved, 05 and their abandonment by several courts
is laudable. 106
A. The Inconsistencies of the Due Diligence Cases
Although the New York cases appear consistent with O'Keeffe,
and at least acknowledge each other,' °7 their particular applications
9 Id.
" Id. at 624.
"Id. at 621.
-" Id. The court later noted that characterizing the defense as laches recognized that
the "defendant's vigilance is as much in issue as the plaintiff's diligence." Id. at 623.
202 Id. at 623-24.
112 Id. at 619.
203 Guggenheim, 554 N.Y.S.2d 992.
I" See Infra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
0," See mfra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
-00 See supra notes 57-103 and accompanying text.
207 See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1987).
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of the due diligence rule have led to differing results. For example,
in O'Keeffe, the court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the plaintiff had acted reasonably in searching for the
painting only by contacting fellow artists and others in the com-
munity 108 The DeWeerth court found diligence lacking in De-
Weerth's reporting to government agencies because she did not
follow up the reporting through the CCP program.'09 Merely asking
fellow artists did not meet the due diligence standard. 10 This
reversed the district court's finding of fact that DeWeerth had
acted diligently "I Thus, one court says that a plaintiff might not
need report the theft at all, while another finds for the defendant
because the plaintiff did not report in a certain way
While the court in DeWeerth may have been correct in faulting
the plaintiff for not making use of the governmental check points(CCPs)," 2 the court also seemed to demand that the owner of
stolen art never give up the search, even though the plaintiff did
not stop until she was sixty-three years old."3 The court brushed
the age consideration aside, suggesting that the plaintiff should
have hired someone else to search." 4 This diligence standard ignores
the simple fact that after more than a decade of fruitless searching,
even the most diligent owner might be disheartened at the odds of
success. It is one thing to require owners to act seasonably when
the theft is discovered, or even when new methods of searching
become available, but to require an owner to maintain a continual
repetition of means that have not worked for several years, with
no indication that success is any more likely in the future, imposes
a burden that few owners of stolen art would be likely to bear.
Likewise, in O'Keeffe, the court purportedly sought to help
owners of stolen art by enacting a rule that would prolong the
statute of limitations indefinitely, if the owner is duly diligent." 5
Two fundamental flaws exist in this rule. First, in order to fulfill
the policies behind the statute of limitations, the owner's cause of
106 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870, 872-73 (N.J. 1980) (recognizig a duty of
reasonable investigation upon owners of stolen art work to prevent tolling of the statute of
limitations).
9 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111.
11 Id.
"I See DeWeerth, 658 F Supp. at 694.
122 See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
13 See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112.
114 Id.
SO'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873.
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action must expire at some time. Otherwise, the unsuspecting de-
fendant will bear the risk of having to defend against stale claims.'
16
Second, the due diligence standard results in unreasonable decisions
by shifting the burdens between plaintiffs and defendants. The
court in O'Keeffe actually favored the defendant at the original
owner's expense by reversing a decision in the original owner's
favor.117 Because of the difficulty of trying to show adverse pos-
session of personal property, defendants would rarely have won
under prior New Jersey law 118 The O'Keeffe court reversed this
trend, putting the burden on the plaintiff, giving defendants a
better chance of prevailing.119
The due diligence rule also might harm the defendants, current
possessors of the stolen art. The Guggenheim case demonstrates
the effect that this rule can have on defendants. The lower court
in Guggenheim apparently relaxed the standard for plaintiffs by
stating that passive efforts could be enough,in0 directly contradict-
ing DeWeerth. In DeWeerth, the plaintiff might have prevailed if
allowed to argue her passivity aided her search by keeping the art
from going further underground. Despite taking far more steps
than the Guggenheim Museum, which was given a full trial on the
merits,12 ' the DeWeerth plaintiff lost.12 Under a Guggenheim ra-
tionale, the plaintiff might prevail, undermng defendants in
DeWeerth-type situations.
The Guggenheim court also decided to weigh defendants' ac-
tions.1 3 This may strike a greater equity among the parties, but it
is hardly consistent with prior law.12 The court further requires
that the defendants prove the art work was not stolen,i2 although
previous courts required plaintiffs to prove that the work was
116 For a discussion of the pnnciples underlying the statute of limitations, see supra
notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
1 O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 846.
"' See supra notes 23-56 and infra note 133 and accompanying text.
19 Tus is supported by the fact that O'Keeffe had won under the onginal standard,
but settled after the reversal; see J. DUKEBMR, supra note 52, at 127.
- Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 153 A.D.2d 143, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618,
619 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), appeal granted, 554 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
121 See supra notes 66-103 and accompanying text.
'2 For a general discussion of DeWeerth, see supra notes 66-85 and accompanying
text.
12 Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 623-24.
12, See, e.g., O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 867 ("[G]enerally speaking, if the paintings were
stolen, the thief acquired no title and could not transfer good title to others regardless of
their good faith and ignorance of the theft." (emphasis added)).
12 Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
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stolen.' 6 Putting this burden on defendants who can trace their
titles to reputable art dealers could cripple the art community. If
buyers cannot rely on reputable art dealers, they may well decide
not to make such purchases. 27 The enjoyment of a $24.3 million
painting over the limited time of possession would be cold comfort,
although the court cited this as additional support for switching to
a laches standard.'2
These anomalies, coupled with the apparent problem that lower
courts seem to have in applying these standards-all of the cases
except Elicofon 29 were reversed by the higher court 30-indicate a
deficiency in the applicable standards. This is partly because pre-
vious cases seem to turn on their own facts131 and yet reject the
lower courts' weighing of those facts. Without clearer guidelines,
the due diligence rule is one destined to be redecided on appeal,
no matter how the district court decides the case. Also, if the
Guggenheim opinion stands, then the due diligence rule may well
be obliterated. Allowing plaintiffs to remain passive to keep the
art from going underground merely transforms the diligence rule
to a rule allowing plaintiffs to ignore the statute of limitations.
B. One Step Forward and Two Steps Back?
Although the due diligence standard is unworkable, the prior
standards are also flawed. A return to a pure adverse possession
standard still offers no solution to the "open and notorious"
problem. 2 If display in one's home is enough, the plaintiff likely
116 Kunstsanmmlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F Supp. 829, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 867; see DeWeerth, 658 F
Supp. at 688 (DeWeerth discusses which party actually had the burden; it would seem to
have fallen on the plaintiff along with the general burden of proof).
I" If even the most reputable art dealers could not be trusted, art sales would virtually
cease. The risk involved would lower the price at which a buyer would be willing to complete
the transaction. The same theory applies to the demand side; if the most reputable art
dealers cannot be trusted, buyers will not risk their capital on art work.
"I Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
129 Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) (using a
due diligence standard, the court found the owner of the stolen art was diligent in searching
and should recover the art work); see also supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
"' See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F Supp. 688 (S.D. N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 836 F.2d
103 (2d Cir. 1987); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 405 A.2d 840 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979),
rev'd, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980); Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (reversing lower court's
unpublished decision and granting appeal to New York's Court of Appeals).
"I See, e.g., DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 110.
12 See supra notes 23-48 and accompanying text.
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would never prevail. Forcing the defendant to display his purchase
publicly for a set amount of time not only restricts a purchaser's
right to do with his goods as he pleases, but also seems unworkable
given the number of works of art that would have to be displayed.
While adverse possession may be well suited to land disputes, it
loses effectiveness in personal property cases133 because of the
notice policy
A return to the demand and refusal rule13 is also unacceptable.
If the demand requires diligence to excuse delay, parties are once
again at the mercy of the finder of facts, or more likely, an
appellate court bent on refinding the facts. The demand and return
could work without the diligence rule by excusing any delay, which
is how some New York attorneys characterized the rule before
DeWeerth1 35 Such excuse, however, would defeat the purpose of
having a statute of limitations . 36
IV. A PROPOSED REFORMATION OF THm DUE DILIGENCE RU.LE
Although the due diligence rule has given rise to much uncer-
tainty and inconsistency in the law, it is not damaged beyond
repair. The underlying motivations of the statute of limitations can
be fulfilled by reforming the standard. Even the extra requirement
of the doctrine of laches-that a defendant actually be prejudiced
by a delay-would be met easily in any case similar to those
previously mentioned. 137 The great length of time usually involved
between a defendant's purchase and a plaintiff's action almost
assures a change in position by the defendant. A defendant's
defense is hampered where all of the evidence may be decades old
and where he had no reason to preserve such evidence.
The problem underlying the Guggenheim rationale is the re-
quirement that the defendants prove that their chain of title did
SO'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873. See generally Franzese, Georgia on My Mind - Reflec-
tions on O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 19 SEroN HALL L. REv. 1 (1989); Comment, The Recovery
of Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. Rnv 1122
(1980).
"' See Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1161; see also supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
,, Lyne, supra note 1, at 36, col. 4.
6 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 57-103 and accompanying text. The scope of tis Note is limited
to cases involving a question of the statute of limitations and thus a certain amount of time
must be assumed to have passed. As the statute of limitations is designed to protect
defendants from having to defend against stale claims, a change in defendant's position is
also a logical assumption.
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not derive from a thief.13 The law already provides that good title
cannot be gained from a thief.13 9 These cases should assume that
the statute of limitations is the source for the proper question: can
title be gained from the passing of a great amount of time? In
order to answer tis question affirmatively, the courts must con-
clude that the defendant is a good-faith purchaser' 40 and that the
plaintiff exercised due diligence. If there is evidence that a defen-
dant is not a good-faith purchaser, then the courts are justified m
ruling in the plaintiff's favor. This decision would be justifiable
even where the plaintiff's actions would not meet the proposed
standard of diligence, because it is inequitable to allow anyone
other than a good-faith purchaser to assert the statute of limita-
tions-a defense vesting title in the defendant and defeating the
purposes of the rule that a thief cannot pass valid title.1 4' Also, a
defendant who is not a good faith purchaser is unlikely to have
changed his position to evoke the doctrine of estoppel by laches.' 42
If the defendant is a good faith purchaser, then he would be
entitled to raise the defense of laches or the statute of limitations.
The courts would have to decide if the plaintiff acted with sufficient
diligence to toll the statute of limitations. For consistent decisions,
the courts must have suitable guidelines for determining a defen-
dant's good-faith purchaser status, and a plaintiff's due diligence.
In order to be considered a good faith purchaser, a defendant
must make some effort to verify his seller's title in the artwork. 43
First, a defendant bears the burden of performng any mnnor
investigatory procedures that are readily available. For instance,
the Art Dealers Association of America (ADAA) maintains a reg-
istry of stolen paintings. '" Purchasers should be required to consult
that registry This burden is minimal and desirable to a purchaser,
M3 See Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubel, 153 A.D.2d 143, 550 N.Y.S.2d
618, 623-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), appeal granted, 554 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).
M See supra notes 12, 23-27.
'4 See supra note 27.
' See supra notes 12, 23-27 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
'43 J. EDDY & P WINsIP, supra note 12, at 521, 538-39. In order for a defendant to
be a good faith purchaser, he must demonstrate his "innocence." Eddy and Winship point
to similarities among good faith purchasers and holders in due course. Holders in due
course explicitly are held to be ineligible for that status if they overlook obvious title
problems or have notice of defenses or claims, and thus that standard may be read into
good faith purchasers as well.
" See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 866 (N.J. 1980).
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who is willing to spend several million or even several thousand
dollars for the art. Also available from Manhattan's International
Foundation for Art Research (IFAR) is an "informational lost and
found" service. 45 Defendants should be required to consult this
service.
To keep this burden from hindering art transactions, a rebutt-
able presumption should exist that a defendant is a good faith
purchaser if he has consulted the aforementioned sources and if
he has purchased from an established dealer. This would encompass
purchasers who deal with ADAA members, large museums, public
auctions, or reputable private collectors. This presumption could
then be rebutted by a plaintiff who showed that the seller had
acted m some manner that would put the defendant on notice that
he might be buying stolen art; for example, if the artwork had
been sold for substantially below its market pnce the buyer might
have notice. 46
Although no exhaustive standards for what constitutes due
diligence could be set out to cover every situation, those standards
most often in question can be addressed. First, "passive searches"
should be inadequate. While it may be true that stolen art may be
driven underground if publicity is generated, it is unfair to allow
plaintiffs to sleep on their rights to recover. The statute of limi-
tations justifiably penalizes slothful plaintiffs. 147 Publicity arguably
deters thefts, making the artworks unmarketable for a longer pe-
nod of time after the theft.
Active searches require not only reporting the loss among fellow
art collectors and artists but also reporting the theft to the police.
Such a duty would cause owners of stolen art to seek the best help
available. In other words, the filing of the nummal paperwork
required would be enough only if no further action could be taken.
If a more diligent method existed, such as the CCP program after
World War II, the owner of the stolen art would have to make
use of such methods.' 48 This diligence would be required for three
years, for example. 149 At the end of that time, if the owner had
no indication of the art's location or had little expectation of
Lyne, supra note 1, at 37, col. 1.
J, .. EDDY & P Wismp, supra note 12, at 521, 538-39. A sales price far below
market value would be clear notice of a defense or title defect.
'47 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
"4 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
1'4 This time period is based on New York's statute of limitations. The period should
be tied to each state's particular statute of limitation.
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success, he would be excused from further search. This excuse
would last until a new method became available. For example, an
owner whose art was stolen in 1910 would be required to report
the theft and to search for a reasonable time, for instance two
years, if no indication of the art's location surfaced during that
time. Then he would be excused from further searching until the
ADAA art registry program (or some other additional source)
became available, at which time he must register with the ADAA.
This would allow for as much consistency as possible among own-
ers who suffered thefts before such means were available and those
who had access to greater means from the time of the theft.
The other burden the owner of stolen art would bear is a
requirement to consult any catalogue raisonne5 o available for the
artist who created the stolen work. Although such catalogs are not
always complete,151 this minor mconvemence may lead to the cur-
rent location of stolen art. To the extent that the art's current
location could be determined from the catalogs, they serve as notice
to the owner of stolen art, starting the statute of limitations from
their date of publication unless it had started earlier. The owner
of stolen art also must notify the publisher of a catalogue raisonne
so that the next catalog could reflect that the artwork is stolen. A
subsequent purchaser, then, would have constructive notice of the
theft, which would deprive him of the status of a good faith
purchaser. Consulting the current catalog is a part of the minor
investigatory tasks a purchaser must perform to obtain the status
of a good faith purchaser under this proposal.15 2
"'See supra note 82.
"' Lyne, supra note 1, at 37, col. 1.
122 This Note recognizes that some European countnes allow purchasers to take good
title from a thief if purchased on the "market overt." The United States courts have
consistently applied United States law, as in Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicon, 536
F Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) (New York, not German
law controlled), and Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg, 917 F.2d 278
(7th Cir. 1990) (Indiana not Swiss law controlled due to the "most significant contacts
test"). Also, as a result of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, which has been ratified by several countnes including the United States,
Italy, and France, sellers must now deliver free of third party claims. UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GooDs arts. 41 & 42 (West
1989). Even if the artwork in question were purchased from a thief, and the United Nations
resolution did not control, the court might still reject the purchaser's claim as being
inequitable. Regardless, such a buyer would not be a good-faith purchaser, as the market
overt should give notice that the goods may have been stolen.
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CONCLUSION
The competing interests of a long-term good faith purchaser
and the onginal owner of a stolen artwork are not served by the
current law. The current law has sought to create flexibility but
has instead created uncertainty and inconsistency. Although owners
of stolen art must have some recourse in order to discourage theft
and protect ownership rights, such recourse cannot be absolute.
These competing interests can best be served by enunciating
clear guidelines for lower courts to apply in determinng whether
an owner has been diligent. Clearer guidelines will afford both
parties an opportunity to comply with the law, reducing the number
of lawsuits that the lower courts would have to decide. Such
guidelines also would result in consistent decisions by the lower
courts. Tis would provide equity, because cases involving similar
facts would produce similar results. This consistency also would
preserve the principle of stare decisis upon wich our judicial
system is founded. Precedents must be consistent to be persuasive;
otherwise, each judge can ignore prior case law, substituting his
own judgment. Only by using clear guidelines can the values of
certainty, equity, and precedent be realized.
Charles D. Webb, Jr
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